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“The means of defence agst. [sic] foreign danger, have been always the
instruments of tyranny at home.”
- James Madison1
“[T]he public does have . . . under our Constitution the right to expect,
that no matter the threat, the search to counter it will be as limited as
possible, consistent with meeting the threat.”
- Judge James L. Oakes2

∗

J.D., University of Mississippi School of Law (expected 2011); B.S., Biology, Wheaton
College (IL). I am indebted to Professor Thomas K. Clancy for his guidance and for his
excellent treatise on the Fourth Amendment. This article would not be possible without
the love and support of my wife, Liz, for which I am truly grateful. I dedicate this Article
to my legal hero, Judge Mike Taylor.
1

James Madison, Remarks at the Constitutional Convention (June 29, 1787), in 1 THE
RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 465 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911).
2

United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 806 (2d Cir. 1974).
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I. INTRODUCTION
[1]
In the face of emerging technology, the Fourth Amendment’s
guarantee of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures3 is
especially susceptible to erosion. As Justice Scalia wrote in Kyllo v.
United States, “[i]t would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy
secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected
by the advance of technology.”4 In Katz v. United States, technology
compelled a dramatic shift in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment.5 Prior to Katz, the Court generally interpreted the
Fourth Amendment to prevent only the search and seizure of tangible
things, and looked to areas of the common law, such as trespass, to
determine whether government action violated Fourth Amendment rights.6
Katz marked a transition from the limited protection of tangible property
to a broader concept of privacy.7
[2]
The advent of full-body scanners in airports presents complex and
novel Fourth Amendment issues. The fact that the Supreme Court has
never decided a case involving the constitutionality of preflight screening,
leaving the circuits with little guidance on how to resolve such cases,
underscores the significance of these issues.8
3

See U.S. CONST. amend IV (guaranteeing that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.”).
4

533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001).

5

See 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).

6

See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (“The amendment itself shows
that the search is to be of material things-the person, the house, his papers, or his
effects.”).
7

See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 359 (“The fact that the electronic device employed to
[conduct the search] did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no
constitutional significance. . . . Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he
will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”).
8

See United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 959 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).

2
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[3]
There are two types of full-body scanners currently used to
conduct pre-flight screenings: millimeter wave and backscatter x-ray
devices.9 These technologies are collectively referred to as “full-body
scanners,” “whole-body imaging,” or “advanced imaging technology.”10
At present, airport security performs full-body scans only on consenting
passengers (inasmuch as consent to the method of mandatory screening is
“voluntary”).11
[4]
Not surprisingly, a bill introduced in the Senate on June 24, 2010
sought to mandate the use of full-body scanners for primary screening
throughout the nation’s airports.12 It is a fair inference that the Department
of Homeland Security intends this technology not merely to supplement
current preflight screening systems, but to supplant them.13 The

9

See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR TSA
WHOLE BODY IMAGING 2 (2009) [hereinafter PRIVACY ASSESSMENT OF WBI], available
at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/ privacy_pia_tsa_wbiupdate.pdf.
10

See id. (using “Whole Body Imaging (WBI) technologies” in reference to both
millimeter wave and backscatter x-ray devices); Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT),
Innovation & Technology, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech
/ait/index.shtm (last visited Nov. 18, 2010) [hereinafter AIT] (using “imaging
technology” in reference to millimeter wave and backscatter x-ray devices).
11

See Privacy, Advanced Imaging Technology, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN.,
http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/ait/ privacy.shtm (last visited Aug. 26, 2010)
[hereinafter Privacy].
12

See Securing Aircraft From Explosives Responsibly: Advanced Imaging Recognition
Act of 2010, S. 3536, 111th Cong. (2010). The bill provides in part:
The Secretary of Homeland Security shall ensure that advanced
imaging technology and other advanced technology with the capability
to detect weapons, on-body plastic explosives, and other nonmetallic
explosives, are deployed, individually or in combination with each
other, in a timely and effective manner for the primary screening of
aircraft passengers in accordance with this subsection.
Id. § 4.
13

Using full-body imaging devices solely for secondary screening creates a loophole:
passengers carrying non-metal contraband who escape detection by Behavior Detection

3
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implications raised under the proposed mandatory use of full-body
scanning technology during preflight screening require the Court, once
again, to determine “what limits there are upon [the] power of technology
to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.”14
[5]
This Article analyzes the potential implications of using full-body
imaging devices in a non-voluntary context. Part II discusses the
historical trajectory of preflight screening. Part III summarizes other
methods of preflight screening. Part IV discusses full-body scanners and
the unique dangers they pose to Fourth Amendment guarantees. Part V
then surveys the various approaches the Supreme Court may take when
analyzing the reasonableness of full-body scanners in the preflight context.
Finally, Part VI argues that the use of full-body imaging scanners as
primary screening methods in airports is wholly unreasonable, and that
airport security should use fully-body scanners only for secondary
screening where probable cause exists.
II. THE ORIGINS OF PREFLIGHT SCREENING
[6]
Preflight, suspicionless security screening measures were first
implements in the 1960s and 1970s.15 Noting the epidemic of airplane
hijackings and terrorist activity, courts generally blessed entranceway
searches in airports, government buildings, and similar places.16 Since the
beginning of preflight screening, particularly after the deadly hijackings of
Officers and successfully pass the magnetometer may evade even a request for a fullbody scan. See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. Certainly, the TSA believes
these machines are best suited to primary screening, raising the possibility that
passengers will become accustomed to their presences and dulled to their intrusiveness
over time.
14

See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).

15

Ric Simmons, Searching for Terrorists: Why Public Safety Is Not a Special Need, 59
DUKE L.J. 843, 850 (2010).
16

Id. at 851-52; see, e.g., United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 806 (2d Cir. 1974);
United States v. Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509, 512 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Davis,
482 F.2d 893, 910 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1182 (3d Cir.
1972); United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1972).
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September 11, 2001 (“9/11”), the scope of suspicionless searches has
expanded, with new methods and technologies gaining similar judicial
approval.17 In late 2001, in response to the 9/11 attacks, the now
ubiquitous Transportation Safety Administration (“TSA”) assumed control
of airport security.18 The TSA, now “responsible for security in all modes
of transportation,”19 mandates the screening of all passengers before they
enter the sterile area or board the aircraft.20
III. STANDARD PASSENGER SCREENING METHODS
[7]
A transportation safety officer (“TSO”) screens all passengers
before they can gain access to the sterile area beyond the first
checkpoint.21 Preflight screening is divided into two stages: primary
screening, which all passengers undergo, and secondary screening, which
is reserved for passengers who fail primary screening.22 The procedures
for screening checked and carry-on baggage also have Fourth Amendment
implications; however, discussion of those issues is beyond the scope of
this Article.

17

See, e.g., Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67, 73, 87 (2d Cir. 2006); MacWade v. Kelly,
460 F.3d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Kyle P. Hanson, Note, Suspicionless
Terrorism Checkpoints Since 9/11: Searching for Uniformity, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 171,
172 (2007).
18

See 49 U.S.C.A. § 114 (West 2007 & Supp. 2010).

19

Id. § 114(d).

20

See 49 C.F.R. § 1540.105(a)(2) (“No person may . . . [e]nter, or be present within, a . . .
sterile area without complying with the systems, measures, or procedures being applied to
control access to, or presence or movement in, such areas.”). See also id. §1540.5
(“Sterile area means a portion of an airport defined in the airport security program that
provides passengers access to boarding aircraft and to which the access generally is
controlled by TSA . . . through the screening of persons and property.”).
21

See PRIVACY ASSESSMENT OF WBI, supra note 9, at 2.

22

See id.

5
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A. Primary Screening Methods
[8]
After surrendering their carry-on baggage for an x-ray machine
inspection, passengers undergo the first preflight screening: the
magnetometer walkthrough.23 Passengers walk through the doorframelike device, which sounds an alarm if the passenger has an amount of
metal above the calibration of the machine.24 Passengers cannot perceive
the magnetic field, and the search is nearly instantaneous. Additionally,
the magnetometer merely indicates the presence or absence of a threshold
amount of metal on the passenger.25 Therefore, magnetometer searches
are minimally invasive.
[9]
The TSA also deploys specially trained agents to execute a process
called Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (“SPOT”).26
The SPOT program is based on the Facial Action Coding System
(“FACS”) developed by psychologists in 1978.27 The technique involves
Behavior Detection Officers (“BDOs”) vigilantly watching for passengers
who elicit a threshold degree of suspicion.28 BDOs are “trained to detect
23

See Julie Solomon, Comment, Does the TSA Have Stage Fright? Then Why Are They
Picturing You Naked?, 73 J. AIR L. & COM. 643, 646-47 (2008).
24

See id. at 651 n.42 (citing United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 805 (2d Cir.
1974)).
25

Cf. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (holding that having a dog sniff a
bag to detect the presence of illegal narcotics is not a search under the Fourth
Amendment, and noting that such activity is minimally intrusive and does not reveal
anything other than the presence or absence of contraband).
26

See generally Tobias W. Mock, Comment, The TSA’s New X-Ray Vision: The Fourth
Amendment Implications of “Body-Scan” Searches at Domestic Airport Security
Checkpoints, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 213, 218-19 (2009).
27

Justin Florence & Robert Friedman, Profiles in Terror: A Legal Framework for the
Behavioral Profiling Paradigm, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 423, 428 (2010).
28

U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE SCREENING OF
PASSENGERS BY OBSERVATION TECHNIQUES (SPOT) PROGRAM 2 (2008), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_tsa_spot.pdf. Once an individual
triggers further investigation, the TSA “may collect,” inter alia, a passenger’s full name,
permanent addresses, employer information, social security number, date of birth, race,

6
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involuntary physical and physiological reactions that may indicate stress,
fear or deception regardless of race, gender, age, or religion.”29
Passengers demonstrating certain flagged characteristics are subject to
secondary screening.30
In 2009, BDOs subjected nearly 100,000
passengers to further screening.31 The TSA also uses highly trained dogs
to detect traces of explosive substances in some locations.32
B. Secondary Screening Methods
[10] The TSA conducts secondary screening due to “a compelling need
for further investigation after an initial magnetometer reading showing
metal.”33 The methods employed during secondary screening are more
invasive, with the level of invasiveness corresponding to the degree of
suspicion aroused by the passenger who failed primary screening.34

height, and weight as well as photographs of carry-on luggage and identifying
information of traveling companion. See id.
29

Id.; see also GEORGE ORWELL 1984 62 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1949) (“It was
terribly dangerous to let your thoughts wander when you were in any public place or
within range of a telescreen. The smallest thing could give you away. A nervous tic, an
unconscious look of anxiety, a habit of muttering to yourself – anything that carried with
it the suggestion of abnormalty, of having something to hide. In any case, to wear and
improper expression on your face (to look incredulous when a victory was announced, for
example) was itself a punishable offense. There was even a word for it in Newspeak:
facecrime, it was called.”).
30

Id.

31

See Florence & Friedman, supra note 27, at 427.

32

See TSA’s National Explosives Detection Canine Team, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN.,
http://www.tsa.gov/ lawenforcement/programs/editorial_1886.shtm (last visited Nov. 18,
2010). Generally, dog sniffs are not Fourth Amendment searches. E.g., Place, 462 U.S.
696.
33

United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 808 (2d Cir. 1974).

34

See, e.g., United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 180 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussing the
increased level of invasiveness accompanying subsequent screenings).

7
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[11] Upon failing a magnetometer walkthrough, the TSO may give the
passenger an opportunity to remove any metal objects from his person and
walk through the magnetometer again.35 This increase in scrutiny is the
least intrusive “next step” of the screening process.36 The Second Circuit
has held a second walkthrough or a similar minimally intrusive screening
is required before a TSO may perform a frisk.37 Similarly, security often
uses handheld magnetometers to determine the specific location of
offending metal on a passenger’s person.38 While more invasive than the
walk-through magnetometer, the intrusion is still substantially less than a
manual frisk.39
[12] If a passenger fails magnetometer technology screening, TSA
agents then perform a manual pat-down.40 These searches are highly
invasive.41 In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court described such frisks as
“serious intrusion[s] upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict
great indignity and arouse strong resentment, [which are] not to be
undertaken lightly.”42 While security often limits its searches to the

35

See Albarado, 495 F.2d at 802, 808.

36

See id.

37

See id. at 808 (holding that a frisk of a passenger who failed a magnetometer
walkthrough was unreasonable because less intrusive measures, such as a second
walkthrough, were available).
38

See, e.g., id. at 809 (mentioning the use of a handheld magnetometer as a method of
secondary screening less invasive than a frisk).
39

See generally id. at 803, 807 (explaining that although handheld magnetometer
searches are short of unobtrusive, there is no physical touching, and the duration is brief
as compared to a frisk).
40

See, e.g., id. at 807.

41

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1961) (declaring the assertion that a frisk is a
“petty indignity” is “simply fantastic”).
42

Id. at 17.

8
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passenger’s outer clothing, security may also perform a full frisk.43 The
line between a pat-down and a frisk is not a bright one.44
[13] While not commonplace, strip searches do occur in the airport
context, and are thus relevant to the full-body scanner discussion.45 “The
lawfulness of a strip search depends on whether the circumstances
reasonably justify such an intrusive invasion of privacy.”46 Although the
intrusiveness of a strip search is tremendous, courts have upheld strip
searches conducted incident to arrest47 and within the penal context.48 In
fact, the Supreme Court has held that inmates, by virtue of their status,
have fewer constitutional protections; therefore, they are subject to more
invasive searches upon “less than probable cause.”49 Similarly, the
Supreme Court has upheld searches of schoolchildren conducted on less
than probable cause when the search furthered legitimate, pedagogical
concerns.50 The Court predicated such holdings on the proposition that
schoolchildren do not enjoy the constitutional rights of free adults. 51
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court limited the ability of school officials to

43

See Albarado, 495 F.2d at 807.

44

See id. (“[T]he right to pat-down carries with it authorization for a full frisk since
presumably . . . we are authorizing what is necessary to get the job done.”).
45

See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 548-49 (1980).

46

United States v. Cofield, 391 F.3d 334, 336 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 559 (1979)).
47

See, e.g., id. at 338.

48

See, e.g., Bell, 441 U.S. at 560.

49

Id.

50

See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995) (upholding the
drug testing of student athletes); New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985)
(upholding the search of a student’s purse for drugs).
51

See, e.g., Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655 (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341); T.L.O., 469 U.S.
at 341.

9
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conduct strip searches of students in Safford Unified School District # 1 v.
Redding.52
IV. FULL-BODY SCANNERS
[14] Full-body scanners have made a splash in media outlets, and their
presence in United States airports is increasing.53 In the preflight
screening context, “full-body scan” refers to scans conducted with either
millimeter wave or backscatter x-ray technology.54 According to the TSA
website, as of November 18, 2010 “there [were] 385 imaging technology
units at 68 airports.”55 It is likely that these numbers will grow, as the
Department of Homeland Security planned to use funds from the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (“ARRA”) to purchase and
then distribute 450 full-body scanners during 2010.56
A. How They Work
[15] Millimeter wave scanners emit radio waves in the millimeter wave
portion of the electromagnetic spectrum.57 Two revolving antennas direct
52

See 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2642 (2009) (“Here, the content of the suspicion failed to match
the degree of intrusion.”).
53

See, e.g., Cam Simpson & Daniel Michaels, TSA Pressed on Full-Body Scans Despite
Concerns, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2010, at A2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB126296286103421603.html.
54

55

See PRIVACY ASSESSMENT OF WBI, supra note 9, at 2.
AIT, supra note 10.

56

See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Office of the Press Sec’y, Secretary
Napolitano Announces Additional Recovery Act-Funded Advanced Imaging Technology
Deployments
(July
20,
2010),
available
at
http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/
releases/pr_1279642622060.shtm (“ARRA, signed into law by President Obama on Feb.
17, 2009, committed more than $3 billion for homeland security projects through DHS
and the General Services Administration (GSA). Of the $1 billion allocated to TSA for
aviation security projects, $734 million is dedicated to screening checked baggage and
$266 million is allocated for checkpoint explosives detection technologies.”).
57

Solomon, supra note 23, at 657.

10
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the radio waves across the entire surface of an individual’s body.58 Upon
striking a surface, the waves reflect back to the scanner, and a computer
constructs a three-dimensional, nude model of the passenger.59 By
comparing the reflected waves to electromagnetic waves emitting from the
human body, the millimeter wave machines construct an image that
contrasts “flesh, metal and plastic.”60
[16] Backscatter x-ray scanners blast the entire surface of the body with
a “low-intensity x-ray beam.”61 When this beam hits an object, the beam
bounces off the surface (“scatter”) at differing angles, depending on the
composition of the surface.62 The backscatter x-ray scanner produces an
image of a passenger’s entire body surface and, based on the angles of the
backscatter, indicates the presence of many types of foreign objects.63
B. Privacy Protection Efforts
[17] The TSA has instituted protective measures to reduce violations of
privacy.64 First, the TSA instituted several spatial protections. The TSO
viewing the full-body scan remains isolated from the passenger being
screened.65 Thus, the TSO viewing the image cannot see the passenger,
and the TSO assisting the passenger cannot see the image. Notably, there
is no guarantee the person viewing the image will be the same gender as
58

Id.

59

Id. at 645.

60

Id. at 657.

61

Id. at 653.

62

See id.

63

See Solomon, supra note 23, at 653; cf. Jeffrey W. Childers, Comment, Kyllo v. United
States: A Temporary Reprieve from Technology-Enhanced Surveillance of the Home, 81
N.C. L. REV. 728, 766-67 (2003).
64

AIT, supra note 10.

65

PRIVACY ASSESSMENT OF WBI, supra note 9, at 2.
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Richmond Journal of Law and Technology

Vol. XVII, Issue 1

the person being screened. Finally, the operation of full-body scanners
must comply with a standard operating procedure (the details of which are
not available to the public).66
[18] The TSA also employs technological measures that mitigate the
vividness of the images.67 The “millimeter wave technology blurs all
facial features and backscatter technology has an algorithm applied to the
entire image.”68 Additionally, although full-body scanners have “the
capability of collecting and storing an image, the image storage functions
will be disabled by the manufacturer before the devices are placed in an
airport.”69 As such, “[i]mages will be maintained on the screen only for as
long as it takes to resolve any anomalies,” and “[t]he image is deleted in
order to permit the next individual to be screened.”70 Finally, any TSO
charged with viewing the images “will be prohibited from bringing any
device into the viewing area that has any photographic capability.”71
C. Privacy Risks
[19] While the TSA heralds full-body scanners as the future of
antiterrorism efforts, it is necessary to consider the negative effects of
using such devices. The American Civil Liberties Union aptly calls this
technology a “virtual strip-search,”72 because the images, while they do
66

Id. at 4-5.

67

See Privacy, supra note 11; PRIVACY ASSESSMENT OF WBI, supra note 9.

68

Privacy, supra note 11; see also PRIVACY ASSESSMENT OF WBI, supra note 9, at 4.

69

PRIVACY ASSESSMENT OF WBI, supra note 9, at 4.

70

Id. See generally infra Part IV.C (stating a machine does not delete an image
automatically if the image remains on the screen until there is a determination of the
source of any suspicious areas).
71

PRIVACY ASSESSMENT OF WBI, supra note 9, at 4;

72

ACLU Backgrounder on Body Scanners and “Virtual Strip Searches,” ACLU (Jan. 8,
2010), http://www.aclu.org/ technology-and-liberty/aclu-backgrounder-body-scannersand-%E2%80%9Cvirtual-strip-searches%E2%80%9D; ACLU Urges Senate to Examine
TSA’s Privacy Violations in Post-9/11 Record, ACLU (Oct. 16, 2010),

12
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not display typical photographic quality, betray intimate details of
passengers’ bodies.73 It is unquestionable that a serious intrusion occurs
when the government takes intimate images of citizens, blurring
algorithms notwithstanding.74 Thus, each image constitutes a fundamental
intrusion of passenger privacy, a conclusion drawing support from the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Redding, which indicated that simply
ensuring the TSOs “will not see everything” does not align full-body scans
with the Fourth Amendment.75
[20] There are a growing number of troubling accounts of adverse
encounters with full-body scanners.76 In addition to body parts, full-body
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-urges-senate-examine-tsa%E2%80%99sprivacy-violations-post-911-record; see also Mock, supra note 26, at 229.
73

See, e.g., Backscatter X-Ray Scan Sample, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN.,
http://www.tsa.gov/graphics/images/approach/ backscatter_large.jpg (last visited Nov.
18,
2010);
Millimeter
Wave
Scan
Sample,
TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN.,
http://www.tsa.gov/graphics/images/approach/mmw_large.jpg (last visited Nov. 18,
2010).
74

See generally Mock, supra note 26, at 230. Algorithms that blur faces and other
intimate details arguably mitigate the degree of intrusiveness, but they do not preclude an
intrusion.
75

See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. # 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2641 (holding that a
search requiring the exposure of a student’s breast and pelvic regions is categorically
distinct and requires justification by school authorities for going beyond a search of the
student’s belongings and outer clothing).
76

See, e.g., Leonora LaPeter Anton, Scan of Girl, 12, Upsets Parents, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, July 18, 2010, at B1, available at http://www.tampabay.com/news/transportation/
airport-body-scanners-reveal-all-but-what-about-when-its-your-kid/1109659 (discussing
a whole-body scan performed on a twelve year-old girl without parental consent); David
Ovalle, Miami Airport Screener Accused of Attack After Jeers at Genitals, MIAMI
HERALD, May 7, 2010, http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/05/06/1617423/miamiairport-screener-beats-co.html (discussing the arrest of a TSA screener who attacked a
co-worker who observed the screener’s private body parts during a training session and
began telling daily jokes about them); Gary Stoller, Backlash Grows Vs. Full-Body
Scanners, Fliers Worry About Privacy, Health Risks, USA TODAY, July 13, 2010, at A1,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/travel/2010-07-13-1Abodyscans
13_ST_N.htm (providing one frequent traveler’s lamentations on the length of the
procedure).
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imaging machines display various medical apparatuses, such as catheters
and prosthetics.77 This leads to invasive follow-up screening to confirm
the innocuous nature of prosthetics and other medical devices.78
[21] The potential retention of full-body scan images also threatens
passenger privacy. Although TSOs “will be prohibited from bringing any
device into the viewing area that has any photographic capability,”79 the
TSA cannot guarantee this rule will remain inviolate. Perhaps the most
troubling aspect, the scanned images remain on the screen until
affirmatively deleted.80 Despite the TSA’s claims of “automatic”
deletion,81 the screening agent must take some affirmative act to erase an
image.82 “Automatic” implies the deletion occurs without any human
intervention, but a more thorough review of the process reveals that
deletion is not actually automatic.83 The retention of images on the screen
until affirmatively deleted widens the conduit for potential abuse.

77

Statement of Timothy D. Sparapani, ACLU Legislative Counsel, at a Hearing
Regarding the U.S. Transportation Security Administration’s Physical Screening of
Airline Passengers and Related Cargo Screening Before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/cpredirect/24856
(last visited Nov. 18, 2010).
78

See id. (“Even the presence of a seemingly innocuously shaped item, such as a
prosthetic device or implant, will require subsequent (and potentially humiliating)
verification. Thus, X-ray backscatter requires a tremendous invasion of privacy with
little speed or efficiency gains.”).
79

PRIVACY ASSESSMENT OF WBI, supra note 9, at 4.

80

See id.

81

See Privacy, supra note 11 (“[Each] image is automatically deleted from the system
after it is cleared by the remotely located security officer.”).
82

See PRIVACY ASSESSMENT OF WBI, supra note 9, at 4. Even if the manufacturer of the
machine disables its storage capability, such action is vitally short of automatic deletion.
See id.
83

See id. (“[An] image will remain on the screen until the item is cleared either by the
TSO recognizing the item on the screen, or by a physical screening by the TSO with the
individual.”).
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[22] Regardless of the deletion mechanism, retention of images is not
the ultimate privacy violation. What happens to the images after they are
taken is merely symptomatic of the actual intrusion: the scan producing
the images. If a police officer took photographs of a home while
conducting an illegal search, destruction of the photographs would not
cure the constitutional violation.84 The photographs, like the full-body
scan images, are fruits of the violation, not the actual violation.85 Thus,
the TSA’s disingenuous assertions regarding the fate of the images are
relevant to the degree of injury,86 which comes into play only after the
violation of a passengers’ person.87
[23] The procedure whereby a TSO views the images from a remote
location exacerbates the privacy violation.88 In United States v. Skipwith,
the Fifth Circuit identified three factors that mitigate the intrusiveness of
pat-downs in the context of secondary searches.89 The court reasoned that
“[u]nlike searches . . . where often the office and the subject are the only
witnesses, these [pat-downs] are made under supervision and not far from
the scrutiny of the traveling public.”90 In a sense, full-body imaging
systems foreclose a passenger’s ability to confront his or her accuser.91
84

Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 362 (1998) (citing U.S. v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 906 (1984)).
85

See Scott, 524 U.S. at 362-63.

86

See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001) (quoting Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)) (identifying the degree of an intrusion as a factor to
consider in determining the reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment).
87

See Mock, supra note 26, at 238 (“[T]he technology produces extremely detailed
images that expose intimate parts of the body and invade basic privacy expectations.”).
88

See Privacy, supra note 11 (“[T]he officer who assists the passenger never sees the
image the technology produces. The officer who views the image is remotely located in a
secure resolution room and never sees the passenger.”).
89

See 482 F.2d 1272, 1275 (5th Cir. 1973).

90

Id. at 1276.

91

See Privacy, supra note 11 (stating the officer and screened passenger never see each
other).
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While it is clear that the degree of intrusiveness is great, the question
remains whether the technological intermediary between passenger and
screener actually mitigates the invasiveness.92 Functionally, full-body
scans are comparable to a system where a passenger physically disrobes,
dons a mask, and stands before a camera while a remotely located TSO
inspects the passenger via a grainy video feed.93 The chief difference is
that with a full-body scan, the TSA saves the passenger the inconvenience
of physically disrobing. The same fundamental intrusion occurs in either
case: the government peeks under passengers’ clothes.
[24] The potential surreptitious interception of images presents an
additional concern. The remoteness of the TSO viewing the full-body
images requires transmission of the images from the receptors on the
scanner to where the images are processed and displayed.94 Although the
exact process of transmission remains unclear, the interception of images
along this path is quite possible.
[25] Although the TSA claims full-body scanning devices further the
goals of safety while minimizing intrusiveness, the technology has
weaknesses.95 Any discussion of reasonable uses for full-body scanners
must consider the efficacy of the scanners. How much safety is attained
through the sacrifice of liberty to full-body scanners? It seems reasonable

92

See Robyn E. Blumner, Government, Don’t Dare Scan My Body, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at 5P, available at http://www.tampabay.com/
opinion/columns/article858283.ece (“Do we really have to show the TSA - some man in
a windowless booth - what we otherwise reserve for our spouses and personal physicians
in order to fly?”); supra note 73 and accompanying text.
93

Either way the passenger is little more than a “disrobed faceless form[] of no position.”
See generally BOB DYLAN, CHIMES OF FREEDOM (Columbia Records 1964), reprinted in
JENNY LEDEEN, PROPHECY IN THE CHRISTIAN ERA 179 (1995).
94

See Privacy, supra note 11.

95

See generally Letter from Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. et al. to Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., and Mary Ellen Callahan, Chief Privacy Officer, U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. (Apr. 21, 2010), available at http://epic.org/privacy/airtravel/
backscatter/petition_042110.pdf [hereinafter, EPIC Petition].
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to infer that terrorists who intend to highjack a plane will diligently seek
ways to circumvent full-body scanners.96 One glaring deficiency is the
scanners’ potential inability to detect pentaerythritol tetranitrate, the
powdery explosive used in the unsuccessful bombing attempt of a
Northwest Airlines flight on December 25, 2009, remains a glaring
deficiency.97 Because the images show only the epidermis, subdermal
objects escape detection.98 A British intelligence agency even intercepted
information indicating that female terrorists might use explosive breast
implants to bring down planes.99 Furthermore, full-body scans do not
discover any objects in the alimentary canal.100 Of course, quantifying the
efficacy of any deterrent proves difficult when every non-terrorist who
flies commercially is a potential false positive.101
[26] The Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”) waged a war
against the Department of Homeland Security to prevent the proliferation
of full-body scanners.102 EPIC filed two lawsuits for injunctive relief and
to obtain documentation related to full-body scanners under the Freedom

96

See Hanson, supra note 17, at 172.

97

EPIC Petition, supra note 95, at 5-6.

98

In other words, objects surgically inserted beneath the skin could evade full-body
scans. See Heidi Blake, Terrorists ‘Could Use Exploding Breast Implants to Blow Up
Jet’, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 24, 2010, 8:36 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/
terrorism-in-the-uk/7510350/Terrorists-could-use-exploding-breast-implants-to-blow-upjet.html.
99

Blake, supra note 98.

100

See ACLU Backgrounder, supra note 72.

101

Any assertion that a particular measure “deters” hijacking attempts is nothing more
than a hypothesis. One can neither prove nor disprove such hypothesis; they can only
support or refute it with evidence.
102

See generally EPIC v. Department of Homeland Security - Body Scanners, ELEC.
PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://epic.org/privacy/airtravel/backscatter/epic_v_dhs.html (last
visited Nov. 18, 2010).
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of Information Act.103 Additionally, EPIC petitioned the Department of
Homeland Security to suspend the use of full-body scanners at domestic
airports.104 The petition garnered the support of thirty groups, the diversity
of which demonstrates the breadth of opposition to full-body scanners.105
D. Health Risks
[27] In addition to threatening passenger privacy rights, the full-body
imaging machines potentially pose health risks to passengers.106 After
conducting a series of tests, the TSA concluded that “the radiation doses
for the individuals being screened, operators, and bystanders were well
below the dose limits specified by the American National Standards
Institute (ANSI).”107 The TSA compared the energy doses to doses
received from other sources: “For comparison, the energy projected by
millimeter wave technology is thousands of times less than a cell phone
transmission. A single scan using backscatter technology produces
exposure equivalent to two minutes of flying on an airplane.”108
[28] Yet members of the medical profession and a few pilot unions
have expressed concern regarding the amount of radiation emitting from
103

See generally Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., No. 109 Civ. 02084, 2009 WL 3874014 (D.D.C. Nov. 5, 2009);
Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
No. 1:10 Civ. 00063, 2010 WL 171520 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2010).
104

See generally EPIC Petition, supra note 95.

105

See id. at 9 (including, among others, the American Civil Liberties Union, Asian
American Legal Education and Defense Fund, Campaign for Liberty, Consumer
Federation of America, Council on American Islamic Relations, Muslim Legal Fund of
America, National Center for Transgender Equality, Republican Liberty Caucus, and the
Rutherford Institute).
106

Cf. Safety, Advanced Imaging Technology, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN.
http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/ait/safety.shtm (last visited Nov. 18, 2010) [hereinafter
Safety].
107

Id.

108

Id.
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these scanners.109 In a letter to John P. Holdren, President Obama’s
Director and Advisor of Science and Technology, four professors from the
University of California, San Francisco, noted, “The majority of [the
backscattering scanners’] energy is delivered to the skin and the
underlying tissue [and] while the dose would be safe if it were distributed
throughout the volume of the entire body, the dose to the skin may be
dangerously high.”110 The professors also acknowledged “that real
independent safety data do not exist,” and outlined several concerns
including: the high risk for the immunocompromised, such as individuals
with cancer or HIV; the lack of research on radiation exposure for children
and the elderly, who are more susceptible to health complications; the
risks to pregnant woman and to the fetus; and the risks of mutagenesis of
testicular and breast tissue.111 Despite these concerns, the TSA remains
confident in the safety of full-body scanners.112
V. REASONABLENESS STANDARDS
[29] In government search or seizure challenges, the threshold inquiry
asks whether the government activity amounted to a search or seizure
109

See Letter from John Sedat, Professor Emeritus in Biochemistry and Biophysics,
University of California, San Francisco et al. to John P. Holdren, Assistant to the
President for Science and Technology, Director of the White House Office of Science
and Technology Policy, and Co-Chair of the President's Council of Advisors on Science
and Technology (Apr. 6, 2010) available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/
35498347/UCSF-letter-to-Holdren-concerning-health-risks-of-full-body-scanner-TSAscreenings-4-6-2010; Mark Forgione, TSA Body Scanners Still Raising Concerns? Here’s
Why, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2010, available at http://www.latimes.com/health/
boostershots/la-heb-airport-scanners-20101118,0,7359745.story (discussing requests
from pilot unions that pilots be exempt from screening because repeat exposure to the
devices’ radiation may cause health risks); see also Nicole Brochu, Airport Body
Scanners May Pose Cancer Risk, Scientists Say, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2010, available at
http://www.latimes.com/health/fl-nbcol-body-scanner-cancer-brochu120101117,0,30262
03.column (discussing recent concern doctors has expressed regarding exposure to
radiation from the full-body scanners).
110

Letter from John Sedat, supra note 109.

111

Id.

112

See Safety, supra note 106.
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under the Fourth Amendment.113 Government conduct that does not
amount to a search or seizure does not trigger Fourth Amendment
protections.114 However, if government conduct is a search or seizure, the
inquiry turns on whether the search or seizure was reasonable.115 Courts
consider preflight screenings searches under the Fourth Amendment, and
generally hold them to be reasonable even when initiated without
suspicion.116 Given the significant threat millimeter wave and backscatter
x-ray scanners pose to passenger privacy, courts must determine when the
use of such technology is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
[30] Unfortunately, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has not produced
a definitive test for reasonableness.117 As Thomas K. Clancy noted, the
different tests applied by the Supreme Court form a collage of overlapping
and, at times, inconsistent standards for determining reasonableness.118
113

See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 294 (1973) (finding the detention of an individual
constituted a seizure of his person before noting the implication of the Fourth
Amendment); see also THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY
AND INTERPRETATION 3 (2008).
114

See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1983) (finding that a police officer action
did not constitute a search and, therefore, did not implicate the Fourth Amendment); see
also CLANCY, supra note 113, at 3-4.
115

See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) (noting that the Fourth
Amendment only prohibits “unreasonable” searches and seizures); see also CLANCY,
supra note 113, at 3-4.
116

See, e.g., United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770 (4th Cir. 1972) (“We agree that
the use of the magnetometer in these circumstances was a ‘search’ within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. By this device a government officer, without permission,
discerned metal on Epperson's person. That he did so electronically rather than by
patting down his outer clothing or ‘frisking’ may make the search more tolerable and less
offensive-but it is still a search.”); see also United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 80304 (2d Cir. 1974) (noting that such searches seem reasonable given their necessity and
public acceptance); United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1277 (5th Cir. 1973)
(applying reasonableness standard); United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1182-83 (3d
Cir. 1972) (“Reasonableness is the ultimate standard.”).
117

See CLANCY, supra note 113, at 468.

118

See generally id. at 470-509.
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The unparalleled intrusiveness of full-body scans and lack of Supreme
Court guidance necessitate a deconstruction of preflight screening
jurisprudence and application of a reasonableness standard responsive to
the need to thwart terrorist hijackings while securing passenger privacy
rights. Accordingly, this section, employing Thomas K. Clancy’s survey
of the law in The Fourth Amendment: Its History and Interpretation as a
model,119 makes a broad sweep across Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
discussing the various standards for reasonableness and assessing the
appropriateness of those standards for preflight screening.
A. Warrant Requirement
[31] The Supreme Court based many of its early Fourth Amendment
decisions on an interpretation that the probable cause requirement in the
Warrant Clause defines “unreasonable” in the Reasonableness Clause.120
The Warrant Clause states “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”121 For some
time, the Court indicated that all searches must comply with the Warrant
Clause (i.e. must be pursuant to a warrant supported by probable cause) to
comport with the Fourth Amendment.122 But while warrants are preferable
for general crime fighting searches, they are impractical in other
circumstances.123
[32] The Court has identified exceptions to the warrant requirement for
situations in which the requirement would unduly hamper law
119

Id.

120

See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 6, (1932); Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 393 (1914); see also CLANCY, supra note 113, at 471.
121

U.S. CONST. amend IV.

122

See, e.g.,Taylor, 286 U.S. at 6; Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 29 (1925);
Weeks, 232 U.S. 3at 393; see also CLANCY, supra note 113, at 471.
123

See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965) (discussing the
Supreme Court’s general preference for searches executed under the authority of a
warrant).
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enforcement:124 (1) when officers or citizens face imminent danger;125 (2)
when there is risk of flight;126 and (3) when there is potential that
incriminating evidence will be lost or destroyed.127 But, “[o]nly in those
exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need
for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement
impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for
that of the Framers.”128
Thus, “warrantless searches are per se
unreasonable, subject only to a few specifically delineated and wellrecognized exceptions.”129
B. Special Needs Doctrine
[33] Special needs searches are analytically distinct from standard
Fourth Amendment searches. The special needs doctrine provides an
exception to the Fourth Amendment “‘when special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause
requirement impracticable.’”130 Nevertheless, “[t]o pass constitutional
muster, an administrative search must meet the Fourth Amendment's
standard of reasonableness.”131 Although the Court has yet to rule directly
on the constitutionality of preflight searches,132 it has upheld other
124

See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 760 (1984) (White, J., dissenting).

125

See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).

126

See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299 (1967).

127

See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40 (1963).

128

New Jersey v.T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).

129

Id. at 354 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

130

Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (quoting Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)); see also CLANCY, supra note 113, at 501.
131

United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 910 (9th Cir. 1973).

132

United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 959 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (stating that
the Supreme Court has thrice suggested that administrative preflight searches are
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment); see City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S.
32, 47-48 (2000); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) (“where the risk to public

22

Richmond Journal of Law and Technology

Vol. XVII, Issue 1

suspicionless searches “[under] limited circumstances in which the usual
rule does not apply.”133
[34] In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, the Court
upheld suspicionless drug testing of armed government employees,
specifically drug interdiction officers.134 The Court noted that a
reasonable governmental search does not always necessitate a warrant,
probable cause, or “individualized suspicion.”135 Searches without such
elements prove reasonable when “the Government's need to discover such
latent or hidden conditions, or to prevent their development, is sufficiently
compelling to justify the intrusion on privacy entailed by conducting such
searches without any measure of individualized suspicion.”136
Considering the likelihood of armed officers confronting dangerous and
volatile situations, the Court noted “the Government's need to conduct the
suspicionless searches . . . outweighs the privacy interests of employees
engaged directly in drug interdiction.”137
[35] Courts have extended the special needs doctrine to include public
school searches.138 In Vernonia School District v. Acton, the Court found
that drug tests conducted on student athletes demonstrated a special need,
preempting requirements of individualized suspicion.139 Additionally,
safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may
rank as ‘reasonale’”); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 n.3
(1989).
133

See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37.

134

See 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989).

135

See id. at 665 (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 618-24
(1989)).
136

Id. at 668 (emphasis added).

137

Id.

138

See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995).

139

See id. at 664-65 (upholding the drug-testing of student-athletes after considering the
nature of the privacy interest at issue, the character of the intrusion, the governmental
interest, and the efficacy of the search in promoting the interest).
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some courts have extended the doctrine to exempt preflight screening from
Fourth Amendment warrant and probable cause requirements.140 In United
States v. Moreno, the Fifth Circuit noted that airline hijackers often raise
suspicion only after the opportunity passes for law enforcement to prevent
harm.141 Noting the difficulties in detecting perpetrators and the chaotic
nature of airport security checkpoints, the court upheld the reasonableness
of suspicionless preflight screening.142
[36] Administrative searches are a subcategory of special needs
searches.143 They serve “as part of a general regulatory scheme in
furtherance of an administrative purpose, namely, to prevent the carrying
of weapons or explosives aboard aircraft, and thereby to prevent
hijackings.”144 In Chandler v. Miller, the Supreme Court stated in dicta
“that where the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket
suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as ‘reasonable’-for
example, searches now routine at airports.”145
[37] Notably, officials do not conduct administrative searches for
generalized crime fighting, but in the course of overseeing some regulated
activity such as code-enforcement searches of apartment complexes.146 In
140

See, e.g., United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 48 (5th Cir. 1973).

141

See id. (finding the particular dangers of airline hijackings give rise to exigent
circumstances allowing for reasonable search without individualized suspicion).
142

Id. at 49-50. Interestingly, this decision conflicts with the premise underpinning the
TSA’s behavior detection program. The TSA program is based on the rationale that
BDOs can sniff out would-be hijackers. See PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note
28, at 2. The Fifth Circuit asserts that suspicionless preflight searches are reasonable
because would-be hijackers provide almost no naturally perceptible indication of their
intentions. Moreno, 475 F.2d at 49-50.
143

See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973), abrogated by
United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
144

Id.

145

520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) (emphasis added). Note, again, the language employed by
the Court is responsive to the relative intrusiveness of the search.
146

See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967).
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New York v. Burger, the Supreme Court upheld a New York statute
authorizing warrantless searches of a junkyard because the business was
heavily regulated and the searches were in furtherance of the
administrative scheme.147 This application was used in United States v.
Edwards, in which the Second Circuit noted that suspicionless preflight
searches do not fit into previously recognized warrant exceptions, but are
more closely analogized to administrative searches.148 Similarly, in United
States v. Aukai, the Ninth Circuit upheld a preflight magnetometer search
as a reasonable administrative search despite a lack of individualized
suspicion.149 While the administrative search doctrine justifies some
preflight searches, it does not provide a license to conduct all searches.
The invasiveness of full-body scans is far greater than typical
administrative searches. Therefore, the administrative searches doctrine is
not an appropriate tool to measure the reasonableness of full-body scans.
C. Balancing
[38] Courts also apply a balancing test to make reasonableness
determinations.150 The test consists of “‘balancing [a search’s] intrusion
on [an] individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of
legitimate government interests.’”151 This balancing approach supplies a
framework for analysis that ad hoc reasonableness does not, but the way
courts loads the scales results in the erosion of Fourth Amendment
protections.152 When assessing situations where a search goes beyond
147

See 482 U.S. 691, 715-16 (1987).

148

See 498 F.2d 496, 498, 498 n.5 (2d Cir. 1974).

149

See 497 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). The court relied on the Supreme
Court’s rationale in New York v. Berger to reach the conclusion that the search was
reasonable. Id. at 959.
150

See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990); CLANCY, supra note
113, at 489.
151

E.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 188 (2004) (quoting Delaware
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)).
152

CLANCY, supra note 113, at 490-91; see Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455. It is worth noting that
the Court expressly limited its holding to finding that the initial intrusion (the initial stop
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normal crime fighting (such as preflight searches), the Supreme Court
loads the government’s side of the scale with the weight of all harm the
governmental regulation seeks to prevent.153
The individual who
challenges a search stands alone on the other side of the scale.154 This
inequitable balancing scheme is glaring in the case of Michigan State
Department of Police v. Sitz,155 where the Court weighed the entire
nationwide problem of drunken driving against Sitz’s personal interest.156
Unsurprisingly, the Court held the balance tipped in favor of the
government.157
[39] A further problem with the balancing approach occurs when judges
place a “thumb on the scale” in favor of the government.158 As Guido
Calabresi argues, this advanced credit is even more dangerous than it
initially appears because such a decision sets a precedent, which
recalibrates the scale in favor of the government.159 Thus, when courts
apply precedent in a subsequent case, they apply it along with another
judicial thumb on the scale, further recalibrating the scale in favor of the

of the vehicle) was reasonable. See id. at 450-51. Thus, the Court only applied the
balancing test to determine the reasonableness of the initial intrusion, not to determine
whether the treatment beyond the initial intrusion was reasonable. See id.
153

See CLANCY, supra note 113, at 498 (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451, which balanced the
damage caused by intoxicated drivers nationwide against the interest of a single driver).
154

See, e.g., Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451 (1990).

155

See id.; CLANCY, supra note 113, at 497.

156

See id.

157

See id. at 455.

158

Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 112
(2003); see Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001) (citing New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981)) (“Courts attempting to strike a reasonable Fourth
Amendment balance thus credit the government's side with an essential interest in readily
administrable rules.”).
159

Calabresi, supra note 158 at 112.
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government.160 This process results in a serial erosion of Fourth
Amendment protections.
[40] Sitz foreshadows the dangers of using the balancing test in the
preflight screening context.161 The government has a tremendous interest
in preventing terrorist attacks, which arguably is a greater interest than the
prevention of drunken driving. Even though a compulsory full-body scan
greatly intrudes upon individual privacy, it would not likely outweigh the
government’s interest in preventing terrorist hijackings. In fact, it is hard
to imagine an individual interest greater than the national (perhaps global)
interest in preventing terrorism.162
Thus, individuals would lose
significant Fourth Amendment protection if courts apply the Sitz balancing
test in cases involving the preflight screening process.
D. Ad Hoc Reasonableness
[41] Courts sometimes make ad hoc determinations of reasonableness
by weighing the peculiar facts and circumstances of each individual
case.163 Like the warrant preference,164 this approach looks to the text of
the amendment and, finding reasonableness to be the only criterion,
determines whether a particular search is “reasonable” under the totality of
the circumstances.165 In United States v. Aukai, the Ninth Circuit adopted
this approach, holding a preflight search reasonable because it was “‘no
more extensive nor intensive than necessary, in the light of
160

Id.

161

See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 458 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“By holding that no level of
suspicion is necessary before the police may stop a car for the purpose of preventing
drunken driving, the Court potentially subjects the general public to arbitrary or harassing
conduct by the police.”).
162

Cf. id. at 451 (“No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving
problem or the States’ interest in eradicating it.).
163

See CLANCY, supra note 113, at 485.

164

See generally id. at 486-89.

165

See generally id.
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currenttechnology, to detect the presence of weapons or explosives [
][and] that it [was] confined in good faith to that purpose.’”166
Furthermore, some courts purport to consider preflight searches
reasonable under the doctrine of administrative searches, but in fact
conduct an ad hoc reasonableness determination.167
[42] The primary deficiency of ad hoc reasonableness determinations is
that the ambiguous term “reasonable” offers the sole source of guidance.168
As such, a court may uphold a search as reasonable where a person poses
no suspicion of a threat to safety. Additionally, a court may uphold a
search as reasonable under an ad hoc reasonableness standard despite the
availability of less intrusive alternatives.169 But, as the Court stated in
Davis v. Mississippi, “[i]nvestigatory seizures would subject unlimited
numbers of innocent persons to the harassment and ignominy incident to
involuntary detention [and n]othing is more clear than that the Fourth
Amendment was meant to prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal
security of our citizenry.”170 The emerging technologies of full-body
scanners create “wholesale intrusions” of passenger privacy and as such,
pose serious threats to Fourth Amendment protections.171 Thus, the
practice of making ad hoc determinations of reasonableness fails to limit
sufficiently the application of those technologies.

166

497 F.3d 955, 962 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (first and second alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 913 (9th Cir. 1973)).
167

See, e.g., United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 804 n.9 (2d Cir. 1974). In
Albarado, the Court noted that the Ninth Circuit, in Davis, considered preflight screening
an administrative search but stated there was “no analytical significance” to that
categorization. See id.
168

See CLANCY, supra note 113, at 485-86.

169

See, e.g., Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1983).

170

394 U.S. 721, 726 (1969).

171

See id.

28

Richmond Journal of Law and Technology

Vol. XVII, Issue 1

E. Consent
[43] When a person consents to a search, courts do not require probable
cause.172 However, an individual must give consent “voluntarily . . . and
not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied.”173 The Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits have held that “consent to the screening process is . . .
implied and irrevocable,”174 in the context of preflight searches because a
passenger “has every opportunity to avoid the procedure by not entering
the boarding area.”175 Conversely, in United States v. Albarado, the
Second Circuit held that providing a choice of flying or enjoying Fourth
Amendment protection coerces away from passengers constitutional
rights, noting that opting to exercise one’s Fourth Amendment rights in
lieu of flying could subject one to “considerable hardship.”176 The court
dismissed the notion the government could announce its intention to
deprive citizens of Fourth Amendment protection in a widely used
medium of travel and then claim citizens using that medium consented to
have their rights violated.177 The Second Circuit decided Albarado in
1974, and since then the argument that air travel is a modern necessity has
grown more compelling.178
172

See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973).

173

Id.

174

See Mock, supra note 26, at 233 (citing United States v. Herzbrun, 723 F.2d 773, 776
(11th Cir. 1984) (dealing only with the minimally intrusive magnetometer searches);
United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1276-77 (5th Cir. 1973)).
175

Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1276.

176

See 495 F.2d at 806-07; see also United States v. Kroll, 481 F.2d 884, 886 (8th Cir.
1973) (stating that choosing other means of interstate and international travel would place
incalculable burdens on businesses).
177

See United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 807 n.14 (2d Cir. 1974) (comparing the
argument that purchasing a plane ticket is impliciti consent to a search with a
hypothetical situation where choosing to use the telephone impliedly consents to a
wiretap and arguing that this would constitute a deprivation of “a necessity of modern
living”).
178
See United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 1989)
(“Commercial air travel, once a luxury, has become a staple of modern existence.”).
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[44] Reviewing Albarado in light of the growing use of full-body
scanners for preflight screening highlights the dangers of diminished
expectations of privacy.179 As full-body technologies become more
commonplace, their presence becomes less jarring, and tendency to
acquiesce to the intrusion increases. The Supreme Court has recognized a
right to interstate travel,180 but suspicionless preflight, full-body scans
erode that right. Here again, if the government has authority to subject
passengers to full-body scans for attempting to board an aircraft, the
Fourth Amendment has little meaning in airports.
F. Individualized Suspicion
[45] “A search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.”181
[F]ull-scale searches – whether conducted in accordance
with the warrant requirement or pursuant to one of its
exceptions – are “reasonable” in Fourth Amendment terms
only on a showing of probable cause to believe that a crime
has been committed and that evidence of the crime will be
found in the place to be searched.182
[46] In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Supreme Court noted there
are “only limited circumstances in which the usual rule does not apply.”183
The level of suspicion required for a search to be reasonable under an
individualized suspicion analysis depends on the nature and duration of
179

See generally Albarado, 495 F.2d 799.

180

See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 181 (1941) (striking down a California law
that prohibited bringing indigent persons into the state because the law placed an undue
burden on interstate travel).
181

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (citing Chandler v. Miller,
520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997)).
182

New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 354-55 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
183

531 U.S. at 37.

30

Richmond Journal of Law and Technology

Vol. XVII, Issue 1

the intrusion.184 Courts uphold searches incident to lawful, custodial
arrests based on probable cause,185 and require articulated, reasonable
suspicion (a lesser degree of suspicion than probable cause) for a stop and
frisk.186 This distinction determines not only when a search may take
place, but limits the scope of a stop and frisk search to dispelling the
notion that the suspect is armed and dangerous.187
[47] “Probable cause exists where ‘the facts and circumstances within
[an officer’s] knowledge and of which [the officer] had reasonably
trustworthy information (are) sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being
committed.”188 For these reasons, probable cause “does not set the
constitutional floor” for determining whether a search is reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.189
[48] As mentioned above, although requiring probable cause is not
practicable for primary screening, requiring probable cause before
subjecting passengers to involuntary secondary full-body scanner
screenings does not hinder the efficient administration of anti-terrorism
measures.190 The fact that probable cause does not set an absolute floor
does not mean it cannot be a floor in some circumstances. Requiring

184

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); Albarado, 495 F.2d at 804-05; see also
CLANCY, supra note 114, at 475.
185

See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 223-25 (1973).

186

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (“[I]n determining whether the officer acted
reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he
is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.”).
187

See id. at 10.

188

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
189

Mock, supra note 26, at 231.

190

Cf. United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 49-50 (5th Cir. 1973).
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probable cause before mandatory full-body screenings is entirely practical
if the TSA relegates such methods to secondary screening.
[49] “[C]ategories of intrusions that are substantially less intrusive than
full-scale searches or seizures may be justifiable in accordance with a
balancing test even absent a warrant or probable cause, provided that the
balancing test used gives sufficient weight to the privacy interests that will
be infringed.”191 In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court required a lesser
degree of suspicion for a stop and frisk.192 Essentially, the Court
determined the level of Fourth Amendment protection afforded to an
individual hinges upon the level of suspicion the person arouses.193 Terry
also provided limits to the scope of a stop and frisk, holding that a “Terry
stop” amounts to a mini-search, allowing an officer to conduct a stop and
frisk when he has a reasonable suspicion a crime is afoot and the suspect is
armed.194
[50] In United States v. Epperson, the Fourth Circuit expressly applied
the Terry rationale in determining that preflight magnetometer searches
comport with the Fourth Amendment given their limited scope and
purpose.195 The court noted the needs prompting the Supreme Court’s
decision in Terry were analogous to those at airports: the need to perform
moderately invasive searches to dispel the notion that a person poses a
danger.196 Similarly, in United States v. Bell, the Second Circuit held a

191

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 355 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
192

See 392 U.S. at 30.

193

See id.

194

See id. at 30-31. Thus, the Court merely required reasonable suspicion rather than a
warrant supported by probable cause. See id.
195

See 454 F.2d 769, 770-72 (4th Cir. 1972) (finding the scope and purpose of preflight
magnetometer searches exempt such searches from the warrant requirement).
196

See id. at 771.
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suspicionless magnetometer search reasonable and less intrusive than a
Terry stop and frisk.197
VI. FULL-BODY SCANS ARE UNREASONABLE UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT ABSENT PROBABLE CAUSE
[51] “[T]he ultimate strength of our constitutional guarantees lies in
their unhesitating application in times of crisis and tranquility alike.”198
Accordingly, the danger of terrorist attacks alone provides insufficient
justification under the Fourth Amendment for the wholesale application of
full-body scanners. All methods of screening used by the TSA must strike
a difficult balance of thwarting and deterring hijackings without violating
the Fourth Amendment. In other words, if the TSA continues to advance
the full-body scanners as a method of screening, it must be do so in a
reasonable manner under the Fourth Amendment.
[52] Making reasonableness determinations either on an ad hoc basis or
by applying a Sitz-like balancing test effectively exempts the TSA from
Fourth Amendment requirements.199 Similar to other types of searches,
“an administrative screening search must be as limited in its intrusiveness
as is consistent with satisfaction of the administrative need that justifies
it.”200 Although full-body scanners make entering the sterile areas of
airports with contraband more difficult, they pose grave danger to
individual privacy. A prudent weighing of such factors is necessary to
determine what constitutes reasonable use of full-body scanners. In light
of these considerations, the TSA should not use full-body scanners unless
a TSO has individualized suspicion that a passenger is carrying contraband
that poses a threat to air security.201
197

See 464 F.2d 667, 672-73 (2d Cir. 1972).

198

Id. at 676 (Mansfield, J., concurring).

199

See supra Parts V.C-D.

200

United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 910 (9th Cir. 1973), abrogated by United States
v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1973) (en banc); see supra Part V.B.
201

See United States v. Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509, 513 (5th Cir. 1973) (“Airport security
measures are reasonable . . . insofar as they permit government agents to determine
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[53] The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Epperson provides an appropriate
starting point for analyzing what role, if any, full-body scanners should
play in counterterrorism efforts.202 Notwithstanding the Epperson court’s
approval of suspicionless magnetometer searches, the court recognized
that the reasonableness of a governmental search depends upon the degree
of intrusiveness of the governmental action.203 Therefore, just as a frisk of
a person on the street requires a greater degree of individualized suspicion
(reasonable suspicion)204 than a less intrusive magnetometer search on an
airline ticketholder (no suspicion),205 a highly invasive full-body scan on
an airline passenger must require an even greater degree of individualized
suspicion. Considering the intrusiveness of full-body scans, courts should
require probable cause as the level of individualized suspicion.
[54] Although requiring probable cause to conduct a full-body scan
forecloses the use of full-body scanners for suspicionless primary
screening, it neither unduly hinders the TSA’s counterterrorism efforts nor
prevents the use of full-body devices. While an absolute definition of
probable cause is elusive,206 the theory underpinning the various
definitions “is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.”207 Thus, the TSA
whether a suspect presents an immediate danger to air commerce.”). Like a Terry stop,
the justification for the intrusion is danger, and the TSO may not extend the search
beyond what is necessary to ensure safety. See id. Preflight screening has demonstrated
an uncanny propensity for discovering illegal narcotics. See generally Aukai, 497 F.3d at
958; United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d at 499; United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d
1272, 1274 (5th Cir. 1973); Cyzewski, 484 F.2d at 510; Bell, 464 F.2d at 669; United
States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1181 (3d Cir. 1972).
202

See United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1972).

203

See id.

204

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).

205

See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000).

206

See CLANCY, supra note 113, at 475-76 (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,
695 (1996) (“Articulating precisely what ‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘probable cause’
mean is not possible.”).
207

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (quoting McCarthy v. De Armit,
99 Pa. 63, 69 (1881)).
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may subject a person attempting to board an aircraft to a full-body scan
“where ‘the facts and circumstances within [a TSO’s] knowledge and of
which [the TSO] had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient
in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an
offense has been or is being committed.”208 Furthermore, depending on
the particular circumstances, a passenger required to undergo primary
screening209 might, in the course of such screening, produce sufficient
evidence to “warrant . . . the belief that an offense has been or is being
committed.”210
[55] Additionally, to comply with the Fourth Amendment, courts
should require TSOs to exhaust less intrusive screening methods before
resorting to a full-body scan.211 While no clear judicial mandate exists
requiring that TSOs exhaust less intrusive means, courts consistently
include the non-intrusiveness of magnetometers as a factor in determining
the reasonable use of such devices for preflight searches.212 Reciprocally,
the highly intrusive nature of full-body scans should render them
unreasonable when conducted without individualized suspicion or before
exhausting less intrusive measures.

208

Id. at 175-76 (third alteration in original) (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 162 (1925)).
209

Airport security may impose secondary screening because a passenger failed primary
screening or because the passenger caught the attention of a BDO. See supra Part III.B.
210

Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175-76 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). The suspected offense would be violation of 49
C.F.R. § 1540.105(a)(2) (prohibiting any attempt to “[e]nter . . . a secured . . . or sterile
area without complying with the systems, measures, or procedures being applied to
control access to, or presence or movement in, such areas.”).
211

See United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 808 (2d Cir. 1974) (“[T]he rule is easy to
state: exhaust the other efficient and available means, if any, by which to discover the
location and identity of the metal activating the magnetometer before utilizing the
frisk.”).
212

See United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1182 (3d Cir. 1972) (citing United States
v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1972)).
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[56] As the Second Circuit noted in Albarado, “the public does have the
expectation, or at least under our Constitution the right to expect, that no
matter the threat, the search to counter it will be as limited as possible,
consistent with meeting the threat.”213 It is one thing to subject a person to
a minimally intrusive magnetometer search for attempting to board a
plane, but as the Supreme Court recognized in Sitz, the justification for the
initial intrusion does not extend to any additional searches stemming from
the initial intrusion.214 By analogy, the reasonableness of a suspicionless
magnetometer search does not make a pat-down reasonable, absent
independent justification.215 Extending this reasoning down the chain of
preflight screening methods, the reasonableness of a pat-down has no
bearing on the reasonableness of a subsequent strip search or full-body
scan. Ultimately, each intrusion must stand on its own reasonableness
justifications.
[57] Unlike arrestees, prisoners, and schoolchildren, airline
ticketholders should retain full Fourth Amendment protection.216 It strains
credulity to argue that citizens surrender full constitutional protection by
seeking to board an aircraft; and as such, courts should not analogize
preflight screening to searches of schoolchildren or persons in custody.
The awareness of ticket purchasers that some manner of screening may
occur does not exempt the TSA from normal Fourth Amendment
requirements.217 Even savvy frequent fliers “have the expectation, or at
least under our Constitution the right to expect, that no matter the threat,

213

Albarado, 495 F.2d at 806.

214

See Sitz v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 496 U.S. 444, 450-51 (1990); see also
Albarado, 495 F.2d at 808 (“At the outset it should be noted that any further investigation
after activation of the magnetometer is for the metal which did the activation; activating
the magnetometer is not a general license to search for anything.”).
215

See Slocum, 464 F.2d at 1183 (considering the reasonableness of a magnetometer
search as well as the reasonableness of a subsequent search of a passenger’s bag after the
passenger failed the magnetometer search).
216

See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.

217

See Albarado, 495 F.2d at 806.
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the search to counter it will be as limited as possible, consistent with
meeting the threat.”218
VII. CONCLUSION
[58] The deployment of full-body scanners in airports throughout the
United States poses a great threat to passenger privacy. Although courts
agree that suspicionless preflight magnetometer searches are reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment, there is no agreed-upon standard for
making this determination. Nevertheless, a theme has developed that
magnetometer searches are reasonable because they are minimally
intrusive and prevent grave danger.219 However, the advent of preflight
full-body scans renders this paradigm insufficient to preserve passengers’
Fourth Amendment protections.
[59] The looming possibility that full-body scans will become
mandatory for all or some passengers demands an assessment of the
amount of privacy the Fourth Amendment guarantees in airports. The use
of full-body scanners to conduct suspicionless searches in airports is
repugnant to the fundamental values protected under the Fourth
Amendment. For airline ticketholders to have any meaningful Fourth
Amendment protection, use of full-body scanners should be prohibited
unless there is probable cause to believe a particular passenger possesses
contraband that poses a threat to airline security. A probable cause
requirement would not upset the TSA’s current screening system or
unduly burden the TSA’s counterterrorism efforts. Additionally, it would
not overrule preflight screening precedent regarding substantially less
invasive magnetometer searches. Finally, requiring probable cause for
full-body scans remains in accord with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,

218

Id.

219

See Slocum, 464 F.2d at 1182 (“[U]se of the magnetometer per se is justified by a
reasonable governmental interest in protecting national air commerce.”); Epperson, 454
F.2d at 771 (“We think the search for the sole purpose of discovering weapons and
preventing air piracy . . . fully justified the minimal invasion of personal privacy by
magnetometer.”); see also Albarado, 495 F.2d at 803-804 (acknowledging that
magnetometer searches constitute an exception to the usual warrant requirement).

37

Richmond Journal of Law and Technology

Vol. XVII, Issue 1

which correlates the permissible degree of intrusion with the level of
suspicion aroused by the individual being searched.220

220

See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000).
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